27th Parliamentary-Intelligence Security Forum – China Competition
Mr. Piero Tozzi opened the panel on China competition by invoking Confucian “rectification of names,” arguing that the debate must begin with clarity about what “China competition” truly means. He contrasted various Western framings from the Biden administration’s “invest, align, compete” strategy articulated by Antony Blinken, to analyses describing China as a near-peer competitor and suggested these approaches underestimate the broader geopolitical and ideological challenge posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Mr. Tozzi argued that the CCP should be understood not merely as an economic competitor but as a systemic rival seeking to reshape or replace the postwar rules-based international order. He pointed to historical patterns in Chinese statecraft, including Legalist traditions and centralized standard-setting dating back to the Qin dynasty, drawing parallels to today’s efforts to shape global technology standards, trade norms, currency arrangements, and human rights frameworks. Control over standards whether in 5G, digital governance, reserve currency systems, or development norms was, in his view, central to geopolitical influence.
He emphasized the need to distinguish between the Chinese people and the CCP, contending that Western governments and corporations should avoid “subsidizing tyranny” through trade practices tied to forced labor or intellectual property exploitation. He cited concerns about corporate complicity, weak enforcement mechanisms, and the need for stronger regulatory oversight such as using securities disclosure rules to address supply chain abuses.
Concluding with references to Chinese historical and literary traditions, He suggested that internal tensions within China centralizing versus fragmenting forces may shape its future trajectory. He argued the West should avoid prioritizing stability at the expense of principle, support accountability in global markets, and allow any internal political change to come from the Chinese people themselves rather than through external regime-change efforts.
